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The Uses of Psychoanalysis in Law: The Force of Jay Katz's
Example
Robert A. Burt, M.A., J.D.*
Jay Katz has been one of the most profound and enduring influences on my
life as a legal scholar. His influence began at the very moment I entered the Yale
Law School as a student in 1962. My understanding of the uses of psychoanalysis
in legal analysis begins with the memory of my first encounter with him. I
believe that my personal experience mirrors more generally how Jay came to
influence all of his students-those lucky enough to sit in his classes as well as
those who have only encountered him through his writings.
Here then is my memory of my first classroom session with Jay Katz. I had
just arrived at Yale Law School in 1962 after two years at Oxford studying law.
Yale treated my Oxford degree as the equivalent of the first year course of study;
so I began in effect as a transfer student with second-year status. (If you'll excuse
the pun, it was transference all the way down from that moment onward.) This
transfer status meant that I was immediately eligible for taking some upper-class
courses and I enrolled in Family Law-taught by Professors Joe Goldstein and
Jay Katz-and this was the first class I attended on my first day at Yale.
Before class, we were told to read the New York state statute governing
divorce and then the complaint and counter-complaint filed by a couple,
identified by pseudonym as Sadie and Perry Lesser.' In their cross-filings, Sadie
and Perry alleged that each inflicted indignities on the other, described in
considerable detail, drawn from some twenty years of marriage. With this
advance reading, I came to class with thirty or so fellow students.
Jay and Joe sat side by side at the front of the room, and Joe began with a
classically open-ended question. "What's going on here?" he asked-and then he
and Jay sat silently waiting for some response. I was puzzled-not just by the
question, which seemed extraordinarily odd to me based on my previous Oxford
law classes, but even more by the prolonged silence from the teachers that
followed that odd question. (The silence, I would bet, lasted no more than fifteen
seconds, but in the garrulous world of lawyering to which I'd already been
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initiated, this fifteen seconds of silence seemed like a very long time indeed.)
Then one student raised his hand and spoke, and then another and another. The
students were drawn repeatedly to the technical details in the statute-the
differences between "divorce" and "separation from bed and board," for
example, and the way the parties' pleadings related to those different standards.
Joe and Jay listened respectfully and occasionally commented directly on one or
another of the students' responses. But after all of the upraised student hands had
been recognized, Joe said "What else?" and silence again ensued. Then a few
more hands up, a few more comments from the teachers and then again,
"Anything else?" and then silence once more.
I sat silent throughout all this, impressed at my fellow students' technical
command and self-confidence and unclear about what was expected in an
American law classroom (though I soon thereafter learned that this was a very
unusual American law classroom, even at Yale). Then Jay spoke. He may have
been entirely silent up to this moment, but in any event had not said much,
content to leave the prior interactions more to Joe. And Jay spoke, of course, in
his accented English which seemed to me at that moment like the very
embodiment of Sigmund Freud himself. Jay said, "Here's one possibility about
what's going on. These two people are at war. They are fighting one another for
their self-respect, even for their lives. This is a life-and-death struggle between
Sadie and Perry Lesser."
At those words I remember feeling an enormous release of tension, a sense
of recognizing something in myself and in the world that I had only vaguely
glimpsed before, an opening of feelings that I had not known were in me. This
may sound melodramatic, but for me this was high drama of an intensely
personal kind. I had come to that classroom with two years' previous experience
of law training and at least ten years' prior conviction that I wanted to be a
lawyer. But my initial exposure to law training at Oxford had only left me with
an unsatisfied question and a foreboding. Why, I had asked myself at the end of
this previous two years, did I want to become a lawyer? The law as I had seen it
seemed to be a set of intricate finger-exercises; I had learned that I could do the
exercises reasonably well, play the game according to the rules at hand. But for
what? Why was I there, what did I want from this profession? Suddenly,
unexpectedly, in Jay and Joe's classroom, I had an answer. Or maybe not an
answer, but at least the beginnings of an answer-coupled with a conviction that
I was in the right place. I was where I wanted to be. I was where I needed to be. I
was in a Yale Law School classroom with Joe Goldstein and Jay Katz.
Then Joe amplified Jay's observation about the war between the Lessers.
"Our task in this course," he said, "is to evaluate the weapons that the law gives
to Sadie and Perry to wage this warfare that started outside of the courtroom, and
to ask whether the availability of these legal weapons makes matters better or
VI:2 (2006)
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worse for these two people, for their children, and for society." I was dazzled,
captivated, and enchanted. And I remain so today.
Jay and Joe ultimately took different paths in pursuing these questions-not
so noticeably in the many classes that I took with them from 1962 through 1964,
but much more in their later writings. In the course of this paper, I will explore
some of those differences because they illuminate various possibilities for the
uses of psychoanalysis in legal thinking. The lesson that both Jay and Joe
taught-the premise that they shared-was that the law properly understood must
encompass the entire dimension of the human condition. The law may aspire to
rational control in human affairs. And in this pursuit of rational control, the law
may aspire to complete transparency among legal actors in acknowledging the
relationship between the law's means and its ultimate goal of rational control.
But psychoanalysis teaches that this aspiration to rationality and transparency
encounters many stubborn, and even intractable, obstacles because of how
pervasive non-rational thinking is in human psychological functioning. And
psychoanalysis teaches that the aspiration to rationality and transparency will
fail, will even become a perversely self-defeating caricature of itself, unless legal
actors persistently give explicit and respectful attention to the non-rational
dimensions of their enterprise.
Jay and Joe shared these two premises and imparted them to their students.
Their respectful and fearless attention to the non-rational dimensions, buried
beneath the confident, imperialist claims of legal rationality, was the shock and
the thrill of recognition that I experienced in my first encounter with Joe and Jay
and Sadie and Perry Lesser.
From these shared premises drawn from psychoanalysis, two diverging
strands emerge-two strands not only exemplified in the different paths that Joe
and Jay took in their own work but also in the history of psychoanalytic thinking
generally. As in most things psychoanalytic, these two strands can be traced back
to the mind of the movement's founder. At the risk of oversimplification, one
could draw a distinction between the early and the late Freud. Freud's initial
ambition was to deploy the insights and methodology of psychoanalysis to tame
the irrational-as his famous aphorism put it, "where id was, there ego shall
be 2 -whereas the later Freud is more skeptical about the attainability of this
goal, as in his late essay Analysis Terminable and Interminable,3 or in his book,
2. SIGMUND FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1930). reprinted in 22
THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 80 (James
Strachey ed. & trans., 1964).
3. SIGMUND FREUD, Analysis Terminable and Interminable (1937), reprinted in 23 THE
STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 209 (James
Strachey ed. & trans., 1964).
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Civilization and Its Discontents.4 This distinction between early and late Freud
may be somewhat overdrawn; but as a heuristic, it is helpful for identifying
divergent uses for psychoanalysis in law and, in particular, for placing Joe and
Jay along this spectrum in Freud's thinking.
As I see it, the dominant ambition of Joe's approach to psychoanalysis in
law, as his intellectual career unfolded, was to identify principles for resolving
legal disputes that took explicit account of the non-rational and did not simply
impose a rational facade on unruly psychological forces. The paradigmatic
expression of this approach was in Joe's work on disputes about the welfare of
children, with the collaboration of Anna Freud and Albert Solnit (and in later
works also with Sonya Goldstein). 5 With his collaborators, Joe used
psychoanalytic premises to demonstrate that children's thinking was organized
very differently from conventional adult conceptions of rationality. At a
minimum, this demonstration required that children, especially very young
children, be understood as deeply embedded in non-rational thinking which only
gradually gives way to self-consciously transparent rational thinking; and we
must further understand that this is an extended process that requires supportive
attention to children's developmentally distinctive non-rationality in order to
succeed.
But Joe had a further ambition-and this, I believe, was his distinctive
contribution in his collaborative works-which was to identify rules that were
themselves respectful of children's developmentally distinct non-rationalities,
rules that could be applied by legal decision-makers in resolving a wide range of
child welfare disputes. Thus from the premise that every child needs a continuous
relationship with an adult caretaker, Joe drew rules to preserve continuity by
protecting actual ongoing custodial relationships with children against challenges
from biological parents, notwithstanding the fact that the custodians had no
biological link with the child. Joe argued that these custodians were the
children's sole "psychological parents," and, in psychoanalytic terms, this meant
that they were the children's true parents.6 In divorce disputes between two
4. SIGMUND FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), reprinted in 21 THE STANDARD
EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 59 (James Strachey ed. &
trans., 1964).
5. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1979) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD]; JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973)
[hereinafter GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD]; JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN,
ALBERT SOLNIT, SONYA GOLDSTEIN, & ANNA FREUD, THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE
LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE (1986) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD].
6. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 5, at 39-57
VI:2 (2006)
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biological parents, Joe applied the continuity principle to require that the day-to-
day custodian of the child be given full, legally unchallengeable authority to
control all aspects of the child's upbringing-choice of schools, of religious
affiliation and even of visitation arrangements with the non-custodial parents.7
These examples illustrate Joe's general mission-to use psychoanalytic premises
to resolve legal disputes.
Jay had a very different agenda. His central concern was not to resolve
disputes but to create them. Jay's mission was to provoke conflict where one or
even all parties to a relationship had not previously acknowledged or even
understood that they were fighting about anything. The paradigmatic context for
Jay's provocative endeavor was the relationship between physician and patient.
In the traditional understanding of this relationship-from Hippocrates' time
onward, as Jay demonstrated in his historical scholarship -there was no
acknowledged conflict between physician and patient. The very definition of the
relationship required that the physician was in charge and the patient was
compliant; they were "of one mind," and the physician was that mind, while the
patient literally had no mind of his own. 9
This traditional conception violated norms of self-determination rooted in
the ideology of post-Enlightenment Western individualism and Jay invoked these
norms to buttress his case against the traditional conception of the doctor-patient
relation. But the heart of his case did not rest on these norms. Jay's signal
contribution was in his use of psychoanalytic premises to demonstrate that the
traditional conception was not accurate, but rather was a crude simplification,
even a falsification, that served to suppress awareness of the conflicts that
physicians and patients regularly experienced with one another. Even more
profoundly, Jay argued that this traditional conception of inherent unity of
purpose between physicians and patients served to mask the conflicts that each
felt within themselves.
The core of these conflicts concerned the issue of rational control. For the
patient, the cherished ideal of rational self-control is threatened by the illness that
drives him to seek the physician's assistance. This psychological vulnerability
was the basis for the traditional medical stance that patients were inherently
incapable of exercising autonomous choice about their treatment regimes. But
Jay showed how physicians' cherished ideal of rational self-control is equally
(discussing familial bonds between children and longtime caretakers who are not their parents).
7. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 5, at 31-40.
8. See JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 30-47 (Johns Hopkins Univ.
Press 2002) (1984) [hereinafter KATZ, SILENT WORLD] (tracing the "history of silence" between
doctor and patient).
9. See id. at xl-xlviii.
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undermined by the multiple uncertainties that are an inescapable part of medical
practice. The basic goal of scientific medicine during the past 150 years has been
to expand the scope of rational mastery over illness and an impressive range of
medical interventions has been devised for this purpose. But Jay maintained that
the vast array of these interventions in itself creates an unsettling problem for
every individual physician who is obliged to "keep up with the field"-to match
his or her personal capacity to control a patient's illness with the complex, ever-
burgeoning tools for such control provided by medical science. And even for the
most up-to-date physician, uncertainty remains inescapable in dealings with
every specific patient due to the inherent biological variability of each patient and
because so much remains unknown about disease processes generally.
In the face of these vulnerabilities, patients and physicians both cherish the
fantasy that illness will be magically cured. As Jay put it in his influential book,
The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, "Deep in patients' unconscious,
physicians are viewed as miracle workers, patterned after the fantasized all-
caring parents of infancy." 10 Physicians, on their side of this unconscious
transaction, want to be "miracle workers," to assure both their patients and
themselves that the "fantasized all-caring parents of infancy" are still available
when needed, whether by their patients or by themselves. Jay's goal was not to
destroy this shared fantasy; psychoanalytic premises instruct us that he could not
do so even if he wanted to. But these premises also tell us that fantasies can have
both "adaptive" and "maladaptive" consequences and, as the good psychoanalyst
that he is, Jay's goal has been to identify the fantasies that were giving shape to
perceptions of real-world interactions and to sort out the ways in which those
fantasies were helpful or obstructive to the underlying goals of the participants in
these interactions.
To return to the contrast between Jay and Joe: Joe's goal was to take the
law's promise to protect the best interest of the child and-as he phrased it-to
"pour[] content into.., the law's standard" through the use of psychoanalytic
premises." Joe began, then, with a legal standard which was patently
indeterminate-it was acknowledged by virtually everyone to be subject to
rudderless judicial application-and his ambition was, through psychoanalytic
insight, to make this standard clearly determinate.
Jay worked in exactly the opposite direction. Jay began with the law's
standard of "informed consent," which was widely understood as clearly
determinate; physicians are obliged to do only what patients request and, toward
that clear-cut end, to inform patients about all available options. Jay embraced
this standard for normative reasons quite aside from psychoanalytic premises.
10. Id. at 192.
11. Joseph Goldstein, Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence, 77 YALE L.J. 1053, 1074 (1968).
VI:2 (2006)
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But his basic goal was to unmask the indeterminacy-the multiple, interlocking
unconscious fantasies within and between patients and physicians-that was
concealed by the misleadingly simple formula of "informed consent." It is in this
sense that Joe used psychoanalysis to resolve conflict where all of the legal actors
had previously acknowledged the existence of conflict, while Jay used
psychoanalysis to create an awareness of conflict where all of the actors had
previously been locked in a mutually reinforcing fantasy that no conflict existed.
Both of these contrasting uses of psychoanalysis fit within the premises of
the field. Freud's original aspiration for psychoanalysis as a scientific medical
enterprise is especially congenial to Joe's ambition for identifying dispositive
standards within the discipline to guide conduct-criteria, one might say, of
"normal and healthy" versus "abnormal and pathological" behavior. Jay's goal of
introducing complexity and indeterminacy is more congenial to the way that
psychoanalysis has evolved in its clinical expression as a therapeutic modality.
Jay's approach also reflects later doubts about the determinate character of the
psychoanalytic enterprise that were expressed by Freud, as well as many
contemporary psychoanalytic theorists.'
2
Jay's path of using psychoanalytic premises to identify and amplify conflicts
where none had previously been acknowledged is the path that I have tried to
follow in my own thinking and legal writing. There is a cost to this approach:
The conventional idea of law demands the resolution of disputes whereas Jay's
approach leans much more toward the provocation and prolongation of disputes
than to their resolution. Though this inclination cuts against the grain of
conventional legal thinking, I believe there is a deep, socially helpful truth that
can emerge from this unconventional perspective.
Let me illustrate this truth by examining two specific applications of the
contrasting perspectives that Joe and Jay present. First, let us briefly consider
Joe's approach to the child custody dispute in Painter v. Bannister,]3 a decision
of the Iowa Supreme Court that attained considerable notoriety as a "culture
clash" in the mid-1960s. The object of this clash was Mark Painter, a seven-year-
old whose mother and younger sister had died two years earlier in an automobile
accident and whose father, Harold, had immediately afterward sent Mark to live
with his maternal grandparents on their Iowa farm. After re-marrying, Mark's
father sought to regain custody but Mark's grandparents, the Bannisters, resisted.
The Iowa court awarded permanent custody to the grandparents, characterizing
their home as a "stable, dependable, conventional, middle-class middlewest
12. See, e.g., HANS LOEWALD, Psychoanalysis as an Art and the Fantasy Character of the
Psychoanalytic Situation, in PAPERS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 352 (1980).
13. 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966).
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background"' 4 whereas Harold Painter's home would be "unstable,
unconventional, arty, Bohemian and probably intellectually stimulating.0 5 Joe
approved of the Iowa court's disposition but not of its articulated rationale for
rejecting the "arty ... and probably intellectually stimulating" father. 16
I cannot help but imagine some small smile playing across Joe's face as he
spoke against the virtually unanimous condemnation among "liberal
intellectuals" of this corn-fed Iowa ruling. But Joe had a supervening principle
drawn from the psychoanalytic premises underlying the "continuity" standard;
Mark should stay with his grandparents because the psychologist's examination
conducted in the case demonstrated that the Bannisters had become Mark's
"psychological parents" during the two years he had lived with them.
Joe's resolution is not vulnerable to the same charge of cultural bias as the
Iowa Court's decision. But I believe he was misled by his underlying conception
of the role for psychoanalysis in addressing legal conflict. Put in conventional
terms, there was a clear-cut and acknowledged dispute between Harold Painter
and the Bannisters-each wanted custody of Mark and each party was willing
only to envision some limited visitation arrangement for the other.
Conventionally understood, the court's role was to resolve the dispute in favor of
one claimant or the other. There is a powerful practical imperative behind this
understanding of the judicial role. A dispute raged between the two parties and
each believed that only one of them could prevail. But this practical imperative
says nothing about the true "best interests" of the disputed child. Joe's invocation
of the psychoanalytically based continuity principle does purport to speak to
Mark's best interest. But I believe that on the particular facts of Mark's case this
is erroneous and that this specific error illuminates the larger mistake that
pervades Joe's goal of using psychoanalysis for definitive dispute resolution.
In my view, thinking about Mark Painter's best interests must begin by
acknowledging the tragic losses that he had endured. Mark's psychological need
for continuity of caretaking had not been displaced by the sudden deaths of his
mother and younger sister. This need was almost certainly intensified-and from
this perspective-almost certainly further undermined, by his father's decision to
send him from their family home in Alaska a half-continent away to Iowa and to
grandparents whom he had hardly known. Perhaps Harold Painter was so
shattered by the death of his wife and daughter that he felt he had nothing to offer
Mark in responding to their common loss, but the further disruption of losing
contact with his father virtually at the same time when he lost his mother and
sister must have taken some added toll on Mark.
14. Id. at 154.
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When Mark's father suddenly re-appeared and sought to resume his
custodial role but was rebuffed by Mark's grandparents, there were two different
ways of framing the custodial question. One way was, what choice between these
two contending parties would best serve Mark's current needs-who should
prevail between them? An alternative way of framing the question was, how can
these contending parties be led to understand that Mark's needs may best be
served (and perhaps can only be served) if his father and grandparents can find
some way to transcend their hostility and work together, wholeheartedly, so that
Mark might have a continuous, strong relationship with both of them?
I believe this second way of framing the question is preferable based on the
psychoanalytic premise of preserving continuity that Joe himself invoked. Mark
had already suffered a terrible loss of continuous caretaking. A decision
definitively choosing between two of Mark's surviving, psychologically
important caretakers would almost certainly be understood by him as another
blow, another loss of a continuous relationship. It may be that these two rival
contenders for a continuous relationship with Mark were so deeply estranged that
they never could be brought to realize Mark's need for both of them to work
together. It may be that a judge would be forced, simply as a practical matter, to
choose between them, even though the act of choosing itself would be
psychologically damaging to Mark. But it would be deceptive, and misleading to
the disputing parties themselves, for the legal system to claim that this choice is
anything but a disservice to Mark's best interest or, in Joe's preferred
formulation, that the choice could yield a "least detrimental alternative."' 7 No
good-and not even a diminished detriment-can come from this choice for
Mark. If the warring members of his extended family truly understood that Mark
could only benefit if they could transcend their battle over him, they would
realize that a forced choice between them can only cause him harm.
This is the clear, single-minded message that the legal system should present
to these warring parties. The system should not pretend for a moment that Mark's
interests will be served if a judge makes the choice that the warring parties are
demanding. And no experts, whether speaking from a specifically psychoanalytic
or from any other professional psychological perspective, should lend the
prestige of their authority to this pretense, even if the warring parties or the legal
system itself tries to enlist them in this misleading endeavor.
There is a proper role for psychological experts in this dispute. It is to advise
the warring parties about Mark's urgent need for them to resolve their conflict, to
engage the parties in extended, sympathetic discussions about the bases for their
conflict, and to explore possibilities for transcendence through empathic
understanding of themselves and their erstwhile adversaries. This is the role
17. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., TIlE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 5.
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conception that lies beneath Jay's use of psychoanalytic premises in his approach
to legal institutions.
Jay made this clear in his account of the function of the "informed consent"
norm in doctor-patient relations. In Jay's account, the informed consent
requirement is not a rule that simply shifts the traditional conception that doctors
make unilateral decisions that bind patients to a new conception wherein patients
make unilateral decisions that bind their doctors. That is, Jay did not see the
"informed consent" requirement as a rule for resolving disputes in the way that
Joe intended his "psychological parent" rule. For Jay, the "informed consent"
requirement can only properly be understood, as he put it in The Silent World, as
an "obligation for conversation."'' 8 The goal of this conversation is not for one
participant to rule the other, but for doctor and patient to converse honestly and
trustingly with one another in order to reach agreement about the best course for
treatment.
Jay's vision of both the possibilities for and the obstacles to this
conversation-and the ultimate consequences of failure to reach agreement-are
elegantly set out in his account of the justification for overriding the norm of
"informed consent" through time-limited civil commitment of people with
mental illness. Jay's account, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal
Fiction, published in 1969, sets out the essential psychological premises which
lay beneath all of his work on the role of informed consent in doctor-patient
relations.1 9 This might appear paradoxical, since Jay's 1969 article deals with
mentally ill people who, by strict legal definition, are incapable of giving or
withholding informed consent and this incapacity is the essential justification for
forcing treatment on them. But Jay's psychological premises erode strict
categorical distinctions between mental capacity and incapacity. The way in
which Jay dealt with the role of patient consent in civil commitment proceedings
ultimately is the same way he addressed informed consent in all treatment
relations, even when "mental illness" or "incapacity," strictly speaking, does not
seem to be at issue.
I want to quote an extended passage from Jay's 1969 article. In this passage,
and in the article generally, Jay purports only to speak about people with mental
illnesses. But as I quote this passage, I urge you to listen for resonances with his
account of the psychological vulnerabilities of all people facing serious illness,
whether physical or mental. Here is what Jay said:
18. KATZ, SILENT WORLD, supra note 8, at 130.
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Most persons whom society involuntarily commits are consciously and
unconsciously so convinced that no one cares, indeed they look at offers of help
with such suspicion, that a sustained period of exposure to an unaccustomed
world of trust, respect, and care is required in order to attempt to modify these
beliefs. It is possible, without precisely knowing when it is and when it is not,
to change defiant, ignorant, and fearful attitudes about treatment through
patient and persistent efforts in an institutional setting. Behind the conscious
refusal of treatment, other unconscious wishes also operate-to be protected, to
be cared for, to be sustained, to be helped. What weight should be given to
these wishes when they are almost drowned out by words which damn their
own self and the world?
2
"
If there are, as I believe there to be, significant psychological similarities
between the people whom Jay thus describes as appropriate candidates for civil
commitment and many people who refuse to accept treatment regimes offered by
physicians for physical and mental illnesses, do these similarities mean that
physicians generally are justified in overriding patients' refusals? Jay refused to
accept this corollary. But his refusal is not based on any categorical distinction
between mentally "abnormal" and mentally "normal" refusals of treatment. Jay
ultimately refused to accept coerced treatment for mentally "abnormal" people on
the same ground that he refused to accept it for mentally "normal" people. For
civil commitment, Jay endorsed what he called "a middle ground, which seeks to
take into account the complexities of conscious and unconscious dynamics and at
the same time attempts to keep such judgments from running wild.",
2
'
Jay's "middle ground" was to permit some coerced interaction with a
physician, but coercion limited to a definite and relatively short time period.
During this time-limited forced relationship, Jay said, the psychiatrist's
interventions would necessarily
be restricted to an exploration of resistances to treatment and thus would extend
only to an opportunity to learn to appreciate the value of treatment and those
who offer it.
... [But t]he imposition of time limits will suggest to both patient and
therapist that the day will arrive when both will have either to bow to the
strength of unconscious forces that prevent therapy or to respect the conscious
and unconscious convictions that deny its necessity .... The participants will
know that the task before them is to reach consensus or to respectfully differ on
20. Id. at 771 (footnote omitted).
21. Id.
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the need for treatment.
22
If, according to Jay's prescription, consensus is not reached and "respectful"
difference on the need for treatment persists, then treatment cannot go forward.
In this way, but in this way alone, the individual's autonomous right to refuse
treatment comes into the foreground.
I believe that this depiction of the permissible role for coercion in doctor-
patient relations when the possibility of mental illness is at issue precisely
parallels Jay's account of the role of informed consent in the doctor-patient
relationship generally. Unlike the conventional lawyer's account which begins
with the premise-one might say, with an almost irrebuttable presumption-of
individual autonomy, Jay's psychoanalytic perspective instructs that the
capacities for individual autonomy and for rational self-control are inevitably at
issue in the opening phase of the doctor-patient relationship. The goal for this
opening phase is for both parties, the doctor and the potential patient, to explore
this capacity. This exploration, moreover, must acknowledge and explore the
doubts not only for the potential patient, whose capacity for rational self-control
may be clouded by the impact of illness, but also for the doctor whose passion for
rationalist scientific control of disease may be frustrated by the challenge of the
potential patient's condition.
It is psychologically misleading to characterize this opening phase of the
doctor-patient relationship as a free interchange between autonomous, rationally
self-controlling individuals. The threat that both parties inevitably feel about their
capacity to maintain rational self-control dictates that the relationship itself will
feel mutually coercive in crucially important respects. This mutual coercion is
not wrong or normatively inappropriate on either the patient or the doctor side of
the transaction; it is psychologically inevitable and wrongful only if
unacknowledged. Through the "obligation of conversation" that Jay prescribed,
these mutually coercive elements should be brought into explicit, acknowledged
visibility. As Jay observed, for interactions between psychiatrists and potential
patients, as well as for the opening phases of all interactions between doctors and
potential patients, "the task before them is to reach consensus or to respectfully
differ on the need for treatment.,
23
If disagreement persists, then disengagement must follow. But this
consequence is not necessarily a victory for individual autonomy as
psychologically understood. As Jay observed in his 1969 article, the
conventional, relentlessly rationalist, legal account of individual autonomy
asserts that no matter what the balance of instinctual and ego forces or of
22. Id. at 773-74.
23. Id. at 774.
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libidinal and destructive superego forces or of inner and outer world distortions,
persons should be left to pursue their own fate if they so "state." Such a
proposition can be as destructive of human life as its opposite of over-readiness
to hospitalize .... Such an approach is as insensitive as the abuse of power that
leads to indefinite incarceration without treatment and with treatments that are
of no value or ineffective or even harmful.
24
Jay's goal throughout his work was not to reject the law's rationalist account
of individual autonomy but to identify the shortcomings of that account as
measured by a psychoanalytically informed perspective on human psychological
functioning and to show ways that this humane psychological vision can be
brought into harmony with the law's rationalism. This approach does not yield
rules for settling legal disputes. Such dispositive rules, as with the conventional
account of the patient's right to self-determination, can too readily serve as
barriers to self-exploration by patients and physicians-in effect, as conversation
stoppers. Jay's goal has always been to provoke conversation and to use
psychoanalytic premises to identify the proper subject-matter for these
conversational disputes.
In my own work on issues of biomedical ethics specifically 25 and
constitutional adjudication more generally 26 -even from my first encounter with
him when I was a law student in 1962-I have been guided by Jay's example. I
thank him for that.
24. Id. at 770-71.
25. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BURT, DEATH Is THAT MAN TAKING NAMES: INTERSECTIONS OF
AMERICAN MEDICINE, LAW, AND CULTURE (2002); ROBERT A. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS:
THE RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONS (1978).
26. See. e.g., ROBERT A. BURT, TIE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992).
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Response
Our Debt to Jay Katz
Elyn Saks, M.Litt., J.D.*
Professor Jay Katz is a giant in the field of law and medicine. His particular
interest in law and psychoanalysis drew many students to his classes and his
office for stimulating conversation. As a person with a longstanding interest in
psychoanalysis and law (indeed, I am in training now to become a "research
psychoanalyst"), I turned to Jay Katz as someone to learn from and emulate.
How might we best bring to bear the insights from a deep inquiry into human
nature on our understanding of the law? Law requires a theory of the person, and
psychoanalysis provides one of the richest that exists. Still, combining
psychoanalysis with the law raises many challenges. Working at the interface of
these two disciplines, Professor Katz has been a model for others interested in
this endeavor. It is a deep honor to be asked to reflect on and celebrate the work
of Jay Katz in this symposium
In this brief response, I focus on three things. First, I address the interesting
distinction between the work of Professors Katz and Goldstein that Robert Burt
has so carefully laid out. Second, I discuss how I see psychoanalysis informing
Katz's work. Third, I discuss how his work has led other investigators, including
me, to pursue a research agenda that probably could not even have been
formulated without his influence.
I. RECONCILING GOLDSTEIN AND KATZ
Let us turn first to Burt's paper.' The distinction that Burt draws between the
work of Goldstein and that of Katz is extremely rich and well-taken. Burt
suggests that Goldstein uses psychoanalytic principles to pour content and
* Orrin B. Evans Professor of Law, Psychology, and Psychiatry and the Behavioral Sciences,
University of Southern California Gould School of Law; Adjunct Professor of Psychiatry,
University of California, San Diego, School of Medicine: Research Clinical Associate, New Center
for Psychoanalysis.
1. Robert Burr, The Uses o Psychoanalysis in Law: The Force olfJay Katz's Example, 6
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 401 (2006).
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meaning into indeterminate legal standards, to make them determinate so as to
resolve legal disputes. To take Robert Burt's example, Goldstein suggests that
the child's best interests in a custody dispute are to be placed with the person
who is the child's "psychological parent." By contrast, Katz uses the insights of
psychoanalysis to create disputes in order to complicate situations where there is
seemingly the absence of any dispute. Consider, for example, the myth that
doctors' and patients' interests are the same, thus obviating the need for rigorous
informed consent.
Burt's distinction captures, and is meant to capture, something aspirational
for Goldstein and Katz, even if their aspirations are not always fulfilled in
practice. The psychoanalytic principles which Goldstein invokes may, when
applied, be no less indeterminate than the general rules they are meant to
explicate. For instance, the concept of a "psychological parent" can be extremely
hard to apply. How many years do we look back? What if both parents are
psychological parents? What if the psychological parent also poses some kind of
harm to the child? What if one parent takes care of the daily needs of the child,
but is emotionally cold and detached, while the other parent has poor skills in
providing daily care, but is warm and connected to the child? One could propose
a bright-line rule, for example, that the parent who has spent the most hours with
the child in the last two years is deemed to be the "psychological parent." But,
while such rules may be relatively easy to apply and certainly bind the decision-
maker, they also risk getting things badly wrong.
In contrast, Katz introduces complexity at one stage of the process, but may
then invoke determinate principles at another (e.g., that the patient must be
willing to converse at the risk of an intervention being imposed on him or her).
Conversation may be open-ended, but ultimately, if the parties cannot agree,
there must be a decision and hence a rule. Yet if people know this decision rule
in advance, the party whom it benefits may have less incentive to talk;
conversation may be stopped in its tracks. If the outcome will (eventually) be in
my favor, what incentive do I have to keep the conversation going?
What the above suggests is that if we take a temporal perspective, both
Katz's and Goldstein's approaches may find their natural homes. We do not have
to choose between the two, for they each are appropriate at different points in the
course of a conversation. Goldstein looks at the point at which it is obvious that
conversation alone cannot resolve the dispute, when the resources of
conversation have been exhausted and a decision has to be made. And Katz looks
at an earlier point where careful and honest searching may lead, so to speak, to a
negotiated truce.
In the end, as much as Goldstein would like to resolve disputes with clear
rules and little room to fudge, he cannot avoid the parties negotiating at times
when the rules are unclear; and as much as Katz would like conversations to
VI:2 (2006)
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continue and ultimately yield an agreement, he cannot avoid ending conversation
at times by imposing some definitive resolution between the parties.
Finally, the differences between Katz and Goldstein may also have more to
do with their normative preferences regarding the exercise of discretion by
authorities than with their beliefs concerning psychoanalysis. Goldstein is
worried about abuses of power and therefore attempts to articulate determinate
rules, based on determinate psychoanalytic positions, which constrain authority.
Although Katz is also mindful of abuses of power, he is more hopeful about the
power of conversation to lead to optimal solutions. 2 Goldstein fears discretion
and Katz embraces it. Ultimately, a decision to take either of these positions may
turn on one's tolerance for ambiguity. But how much tolerance is optimal in this
context, and for legal actors in particular, is an open question.
II. THE SILENT WORLD OF PSYCHOANALYSIS
Katz's work is thoroughly influenced by psychoanalytic ideas. A central
theme throughout his work is that unconscious and irrational influences on
decision-making are pervasive. This of course is Freud's central insight.3 Also
important are Katz's psychoanalytic ideas about how those unconscious and
irrational processes affect the doctor-patient relationship in particular. For
example, the patient may unconsciously and irrationally endow the doctor with
omnipotent powers to cure him, and the doctor may have unconscious fantasies
about being an all-powerful rescuer or savior. These fantasies emerge most
pointedly in the course of a psychoanalytic treatment, and, as an analyst, Katz
will have experienced them at close hand. A third and extremely important
insight in his work is that we must apply these principles not only to patients, but
also to doctors. Psychoanalysts are trained to be mindful of their own fantasies
2. Thus, in an especially hopeful passage, Katz writes:
If doctors could learn, and in turn teach their patients, that it is possible to sit down and
reason together about the most important personal anxieties and fears that illness and its
treatment engenders, then they could also point the way to living life not by submission
but by mutual respect, with careful attentiveness to one's own and the other's
rationalities and irrationalities. Living the life of medicine in such new and
unaccustomed ways could extend the dominion of reason and thus make doctors true
healers to mankind.
JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 226 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2002)
(1984) [hereinafter KATZ, SILENT WORLD].
3. See. e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), reprinted in 4, 5 THE
STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 1 (James
Strachey ed. & trans., 1964) [hereinafter, FREUD, Interpretation of Dreams]; SIGMUND FREUD, The
Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1911), reprinted in 6 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE
COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD I (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1964).
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and fears as they treat patients. They must maintain their vigilance lest they fall
into unwitting "enactments" with their patients.
All of the above leads Katz to propose a new understanding of psychological
autonomy that takes into account the influence of the unconscious and the
irrational. He is not satisfied with abstract principles, such as Kant's, that lack a
foundation in both the rational and the irrational aspects of human nature.4
Finally, Katz proposes a means of accommodating the decision-making
frailties he describes: a searching conversation about the patient's-and the
doctor's-thoughts and fantasies. Psychoanalysis is the "talking cure,",5 and that,
in part, is what Katz wants for all physician-patient interactions. He is, of course,
mindful that doctors cannot be expected to conduct a mini-analysis when they are
informing patients. Yet for the analyst, as for Katz, insight is key: The truth shall
set one free.
One striking thing about Katz's approach is its origins in a discipline that,
until relatively recently, involved the most "silent" doctor of all-the analyst.
Classical analysts are meant to be anonymous to their patients, sparing in what
they will say, and neutral as to the values of their patients. Analyst neutrality is
an important part of Katz's perspective. But the traditional anonymity and
abstinence-which may lead to virtual silence-seem to conflict with Katz's
prescription for conversation. The good analyst will be conversing with herself,
so to speak, in order to be mindful of her participation in the phenomena
emerging in the consulting room. But she will not reveal her thoughts and
fantasies to the patient.
Even among classical analysts, of course, the "blank screen" is currently
understood as somewhat mythic.6 And there are also other psychoanalytic
schools that bring the doctor's relationship with the patient into sharper focus as
the agent of change.7 There are also raging debates about how "self-disclosing"
4. See, e.g., KATZ, SILENT WORLD, supra note 2, at 108.
5. See SIGMUND FREUD, Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1910), reprinted in 11 THE
STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 1, 21 (James
Strachey ed. & trans., 1964).
6. See, e.g., James L. Fosshage, Toward Reconceptualizing Transference: Theoretical and
Clinical Considerations, 75 INT'L J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 265 (1994); Jay R. Greenberg, Prescription
or Description: The Therapeutic Action of Psychoanalysis, 17 CONTEMP. PSYCHOANALYSIS 239
(1981); Irwin Z. Hoffman, The Patient as Interpreter of the Analyst's Experience, 19 CONTEMP.
PSYCHOANALYSIS 389 (1983).
7. See, e.g., JOSEPH M. NATTERSON & RAYMOND J. FRIEDMAN, A PRIMER OF CLINICAL
INTERSUBJECTIVITY (1995); ROBERT D. STOLOROW ET AL., PSYCHOANALYTIC TREATMENT: AN
INTERSUBJECTIVE APPROACH (1987); Howard B. Levine & Raymond J. Friedman, Intersubjectivity
and Interaction in the Analytic Relationship, 69 PSYCHOANALYTIC Q. 63 (2000); Thomas H. Ogden,
The Analytic Third: Implications for Psychoanalytic Theory and Technique, 73 PSYCHOANALYTIC
VI:2 (2006)
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analysts should be.' It would be interesting to explore whether Katz's ideas
would lead him to recommend a different relationship between analysts and
patients than classical analysts have prescribed. It would also be interesting to see
whether he would think disclosure is desirable in order to respect patients, even
when this is not optimal therapeutically (and, to make things harder, when what
is optimal therapeutically will have the effect of increasing the patient's overall
autonomy).
11I. OUR CONTINUING DEBT
This leads me to discuss three directions that Katz's works suggest we take,
and that I and others have begun to pursue. The first is to study informed consent
in Katz's very domain-that of psychoanalysis. What are psychoanalysts'
practices regarding informed consent, and what should those practices be?
Should analysts simply assume consent if the patient keeps coming back? Or
should analysts inform patients at the beginning of treatment about the nature,
risks and benefits of, and alternatives to, the treatment? Are there other or
different elements of informed consent, in this context, and if so, what are they?
Perhaps most intriguing is the question whether informed consent is even
possible in the psychoanalytic context. Perhaps the patient can understand, for
example, transference and regression 9 only after they have already occurred, at
which point it might be too late to act on that understanding since the patient can
no longer easily extricate himself from the relationship with the analyst. Another
important issue is whether informed consent in the psychoanalytic process is
likely to be therapeutic or counter-therapeutic. Analysts' norms concerning
abstinence, for example, might be such that the informed consent process would
be in tension with these norms and might therefore be counter-therapeutic.
I intend to do legal, theoretical, and empirical research on this question.' ° It
Q. 167 (2004); Robert D. Stolorow & George E. Atwood, Deconstructing the M'th of the Neutral
Analyst: An Alternative from Intersubjective Systems Theory, 66 PSYCHOANALYTIC Q. 431 (1997);
Robert D. Stolorow, From Isolated Minds to Experiential Worlds: An Intersubjective Space
Odyssey, 54 AMER. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 149 (2000).
8. See. e.g., NATTERSON & FRIENDMAN, supra note 7.
9. "Transference" refers to the "displacement of patterns of feelings, thoughts, and behavior,
originally experienced in relation to significant figures during childhood, onto a person involved in
a current interpersonal relationship." PSYCHOANALYTIC TERMS AND CONCEPTS 196-97 (Burness E.
Moore & Bernard D. Fine eds., 1990). "Regression" means a "return to a more developmentally
immature level of mental functioning." Id. at 164-65.
10. My project on informed consent is supported by grants from the International
Psychoanalytic Association's Research Advisory Board and the American Psychoanalytic
Foundation. See Elyn Saks, Infbrined Consent and the Therapeutic Alliance (Feb. 12, 2006)
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will be interesting to see what analysts do, what their reasons are, and whether
obtaining patients' informed consent has been helpful or harmful. Looking at the
informed consent question directly in the psychoanalytic process should lead to
insights that will be helpful in other medical contexts. Indeed, Katz has already
shown that bringing psychoanalytic ideas to bear on understanding informed
consent in the general medical context is a fruitful approach."l At a minimum,
one would expect analysts to be more sensitive than others to unconscious and
irrational forces at work in the informed consent process.
The second direction in which Katz's work leads us concerns our stance
toward the seriously mentally ill. Katz writes mostly about non-psychiatrically ill
patients (the exception is his Enchanting Legal Fiction article 2). His emphasis
on the pervasive influence of the irrational and the unconscious has the effect of
breaching a perhaps idealized and distinct boundary between the mentally ill and
the mentally healthy. Psychoanalysis teaches that we all have many unconscious
and irrational fantasies. Psychiatric patients and other patients (indeed, people
generally) are on a continuum. Two paths are then possible: to restrict the
freedom of some apparently rational people or to protect the choices of some
apparently irrational people.
In my own work on abrogating patient choice 13 I draw on three broad
principles, all rooted in Katz's work: protecting the right to be unconventional
(our "autonomy interest"); protecting those incapable of caring for themselves
(our "paternalism interest"); and not discriminating on the basis of irrational
beliefs that are pervasive among the non-ill and ill alike (our "nondiscrimination
interest"). Katz has given special emphasis to the idea that all of us are
pervasively irrational.
4
Another principle that comes from Katz's work is to identify culprits that
may compromise patients in the doctor/patient relationship, e.g., fantasies about
doctor omnipotence. With these pitfalls in mind one can design instruments to
assess people's capacity in different contexts. Katz's ideas have certainly
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). The empirical part of the project has just begun,
four hundred surveys having been recently sent to analysts around the country.
11. This is the central endeavor of KATZ, SILENT WORLD, supra note 2.
12. Jay Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 755
(1969) [hereinafter Katz, Enchanting].
13. See, e.g., ELYN R. SAKS, REFUSING CARE: FORCED TREATMENT AND THE RIGHTS OF THE
MENTALLY ILL (2002); ELYN R. SAKS, Competency To Decide on Treatment and Research: The
MacArthur Capacity Instruments, in 2 COMMISSIONED PAPERS BY THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS
ADVISORY COMMISSION: RESEARCH INVOLVING PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS THAT MAY
AFFECT DECISION-MAKING CAPACITY 59 (1999); Elyn R. Saks, Competency To Refuse Treatment,
69 N.C. L. REV. 945 (1991).
14. KATZ, SILENT WORLD, supra note 2, at 118-19.
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influenced my colleagues and me in formulating the "California Scale of
Appreciation" (CSA), an instrument we have designed to measure one aspect of
capacity to consent to research.
1 5
The CSA measures deficiencies in a subject's understanding of the factors
bearing on a decision to participate in research. An example of a "deficiency" in
this regard is a subject's belief that the researcher is omnipotent-an item coming
directly from Katz's work. Another example would be a subject's belief that
withdrawing from the study would cause some catastrophic event to occur.
Katz's underscoring of the pervasive influence of the irrational has also led us to
require a gross departure from the norm in how one fails to appreciate the issues
in order to be classified as incompetent; to do otherwise would be to risk
discriminating against the mentally ill. To that end, we make use of the idea of a
"patently false belief' in judging patients' appreciation.
One interesting problem arises, though, when one accepts Katz's account of
our compromised decisional abilities: Why should we distinguish between the
mentally ill and the mentally healthy in a case in which their decisions are
motivated by the same fantasy?16 For example, if a psychotic patient says his
reason for agreeing to undergo surgery is that his doctor is God and therefore no
harm will befall him, we would say he was incompetent to decide. But what
about the non-ill patient who has the same unconscious fantasy that leads him to
the same decision? What difference does it make whether the fantasy is
conscious?
In his Enchanting Fiction paper, Katz speaks of the primary process
overrunning secondary process ways of thinking in this situation. 7 Although
descriptively true, this does not address why consent is invalid, as a normative
matter, when this "overrunning" occurs (and not when it does not). Put
differently, why does the invasion of the primary process matter if both patients
15. Elyn R. Saks et al., The California Scale of Appreciation: A New Instrument To Measure
the Appreciation Component of Capacity To Consent to Research, 10 AM. J. GERIATRIC
PSYCHIATRY 166 (2002).
16. Elyn R. Saks, Mental Health Law: Three Scholarly Traditions, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 295
(2000).
17. See Katz, Enchanting, supra note 12, at 769-70. For the distinction between "primary
process" and "secondary process" see FREUD, Interpretation of Dreams, supra note 3, at ch. 7.
According to Moore and Fine, the concept of primary process, on a descriptive level, "embraces
such characteristics of unconscious mentation as the disregard of logical connections, the
coexistence of contradictions, the absence of a temporal dimension and of negatives, and the use of
indirect representation and concretization (imagery)." Secondary process thinking is "[g]overned
by the reality principle: it accounts for reality-attuned, logical thought, exemplified by delayed,
modulated drive gratification through problem-solving (the internal activity of trial and error)."
PSYCHOANALYTIC TERMS AND CONCEPTS, supra note 9, at 148.
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have the same belief and that belief is the real reason they are making their
decision? Why should we care whether the primary process thinking has become
conscious?
One response to the notion that unconscious and conscious fantasies should
be equally regarded is that unconscious fantasies are not accessible. But
psychoanalysts make judgments all the time (fairly reliable judgments, one
hopes) about fantasies the patients themselves may be unaware of. The ability to
do so is the whole premise of psychoanalysis. Indeed, many patients do not
acknowledge these fantasies even after they are brought to their attention, and yet
the analyst may be quite certain that they exist and are exerting force toward
certain action.
In addition to the "access" issue, more general proof issues may exist. The
best way to establish that the psychoanalyst got it right is if the patient
acknowledges that she did. But this is not the only way. In the end,
notwithstanding the issue of practicality, the question of unconscious fantasies
underlying choice is one of immense theoretical interest.
This puzzle aside, Katz's work normalizing the pathological and
pathologizing the normal is extremely important as we think about how to treat
those with serious mental illness. A few points seem to follow from his humane,
yet sophisticated, approach. Even severely mentally ill people have pockets of
health that can and should be tended. Like healthy people, they deserve respect
and respectful conversation. Indeed, psychiatric patients desire to be treated with
dignity just as do the mentally healthy. Moreover, given their patent
vulnerabilities, these patients perhaps should receive more, rather than less,
respectful conversation. As Katz rightly points out, many seriously ill psychiatric
patients have the unconscious fantasy that they are not deserving of respect.
18
How much more important, then, to give it to them. The conversation should help
empower even psychotic patients to mobilize what strengths they have to make
competent decisions.
In fact, empirical research shows that patients with schizophrenia are
capable of normal decision-making. 19 For instance, on the California Scale of
Appreciation, only between approximately eight and thirteen percent of older
outpatients with psychosis were incompetent. 20 This percent of the patients held
patently false beliefs-again, the barometer of unacceptable beliefs-bearing on
their condition and the research they were participating in. This result should
18. See Katz, Enchanting, supra note 12, at 768, 771.
19. Laura B. Dunn et al., Assessing Decisional Capacity for Clinical Research or Treatment: A
Review of Instruments, AM. J. PSYCHIATRY (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 32-41, on file with
author).
20. Id. at 170.
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perhaps not be surprising given Katz's work. The mentally ill and mentally
healthy may be much closer to each other than we might have expected or would
wish to believe.
The third and final direction that Katz's work suggests is toward new efforts
to enable seriously ill psychiatric patients to make competent choices even when
they initially appear incompetent. For example, my colleagues at University of
California, San Diego School of Medicine and I are designing and studying
"enhanced consent" protocols which allow schizophrenic patients to attain as
much understanding as normal controls in a brief period of time.2' Our notion is
that the problem may not be in the patients' capacities but rather in the
investigators' way of presenting the material. That is, the problem lies with the
means of informing for consent and not with the patients' ability to be informed.
Katz's prescription of searching for ways of communicating and obtaining
consent has fueled much of this research.
In closing, I would like to say one thing about the idea of "conversation."
Some people might say that this idea represents a desire and goal of very verbal
people. In the same way, some people might say that psychoanalytic
conversations are only attractive to and effective with "sophisticated" people. But
I think this criticism misses the point of Katz's call for conversation. This call is
about respecting people, wherever they are, and helping them, in their own
language, to understand and explore what is happening to them, and some of
their deeper feelings about what is happening to them. You do not have to be a
college graduate to appreciate the enormous benefits of conversation. Everyone,
at some level, wants and can be benefited by such conversation.
Jay Katz has begun a deep and rich-as well as important-conversation
with the discipline of psychoanalysis which shows no sign of ending. Our debt to
him is enormous.
21. Laura B. Dunn et al., Improving Understanding of Research Consent in Middle-Aged and
Elderh, Patients with Psychotic Disorders, 10 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 142 (2002); Laura B.
Dunn & Dilip V. Jeste, Enhancing Informed Consent for Research and Treatment, 24
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 595 (2001). In addition, my colleagues and I are engaged in an
NIMH-funded empirical study of an enhanced consent procedure using DVDs.
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Response
A More Skeptical Bioethics
Charles Bosk, M.A., Ph.D.*
When I first read Professor Burt's paper, The Uses of Psychoanalysis in
Illuminating Biomedical Ethics,' I was overcome by feelings of regret and self-
pity occasioned by not having ever had as part of my graduate coursework the
intellectually provocative experience that the paper describes so well. But after
working through these feelings, I began to be able to identify the qualities that
make Jay Katz's work so rich and, by contrast, the features that make more
pedestrian efforts in bioethics so irritating. 2 Professor Burt describes two basic
methodological lessons he discovered while sitting in Jay Katz's class and
reading his writings. From these, I draw one substantive principle.
The first methodological lesson Burt describes is to look for the tensions
underneath the smooth surface of social relations, to look for conflicts where
social arrangements are organized in ways that deny their existence. The second
lesson he describes is to never trust policies, regulatory regimes, or social
processes that celebrate the rational self-control that they provide decision-
makers. The substantive lesson I draw from this is that we should know better
than to trust those social fictions we create in an effort to convince ourselves that
we are the kind of decision-makers rational choice theories assume that we are.
Uncertainty and indeterminacy cannot be eliminated from social life by grants of
autonomy that deliver something much less in practice than what they promise in
theory. There are some enduring, existential difficulties built into group life that
no organizational policies or bureaucratic procedures can erase.
Now some might say that these are difficult lessons. I would agree, but add
that it is the hardness of these lessons, their unblinking look at the human
* Professor of Sociology and Medical Ethics, University of Pennsylvania.
1. Robert Burt, The Uses of Psychoanalysis in Law: The Force of Jay Katz's Example, 6
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 401 (2006).
2. The work of Jay Katz on informed consent, JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND
PATIENT (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2002) (1984), is the touchstone for this commentary. But the
same points could just as easily have been made focusing on Jay Katz's work on human
experimentation or reproductive rights.
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condition, especially the vulnerabilities and anxieties of both the ill and their
care-takers, that make Jay Katz's work so worth reading and re-reading. Jay Katz
never pretends that one can achieve informed consent in a single encounter. The
achievement of what we once ponderously called "fully informed voluntary
consent" is more an aspirational goal than it is an easily measured, concrete
outcome. Vulnerable and anxious patients can understand something one moment
and forget it the next. Nor are physicians neutral channels through which
information passes without distortion. Far from disinterested parties, physicians
often convey, albeit unintentionally, an unreasonable optimism, if only to quiet
underlying feelings of inadequacy created by a social role that places them both
in charge and powerless in the face of incurable illnesses. False hope prevents the
motivation of physicians from flagging. At the same time, desperate patients and
their families hang on to the thin reed of the statistically improbable medical
remedy, which inhibits them from either giving voice to vague anxieties or
framing specific questions. On the shop floor of the modern hospital "consent"
has become an intransitive verb. The question that one commonly hears there-
"Has the patient been consented yet?"-is evidence of how hard it is to absorb
the lessons Jay Katz has tried to teach. The usage also signals that we ought to
continue trying to teach the deeper lessons contained in his teachings and
writings.
Because I have limited space, I am going to ask the reader's indulgence as I
make several sweeping-but not, I believe, inaccurate-generalizations. One
reason that medical residents think nothing of asking each other, "Has the patient
been consented yet?" is that the understanding of the ethical problems in
American bioethics encourages such usage. American bioethics shares with
American culture an ethos of meliorism, a "can-do" optimism.3 American
culture, and American bioethics as a concrete manifestation of that culture, often
seem to be guided by the implausible notion that all problems are soluble if we
use scientific methods to analyze social difficulties. Such analyses will then lead
us to adopt better procedures, to formulate better rules, and to provide better
training, all of which lead to improved outcomes.
What is striking in the theories that I was taught oh-so-long-ago as a
graduate student was just how naive they appeared to be about human nature.4
3. See, e.g., PHILIP RIEFF, FREUD: THE MIND OF THE MORALIST 392 (1961). For a presentation
and critique of the views of the American Progressive Movement see THE PROGRESSIVE
MOVEMENT: 1900-1915 (Richard Hoftsadter ed., 1965). A trenchant critique of the "helping
professions" is contained in C. Wright Mills, Professional Ideology of Social Pathologists, 49
AMER. J. SOC. 165 (1943). For a discussion of how melioristic optimism has impacted medical care,
see SHELIA ROTHMAN & DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE PURSUIT OF PERFECTION: THE PROMISE AND
PERILS OF MEDICAL ENHANCE MENT (2003).
4. A great deal of American Social Theory sits uneasily between attempts to develop a
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For progressive social theorists in the first third of the twentieth century, when
groups conflict, better communication solves all difficulties. There is no
recognition that the resolution of some conflicts requires structural change, a
redistribution of resources, rather than simply more complete sympathy,
empathy, and understanding among contending parties. 5 Lacking a dynamic
theory of the unconscious, American social theorists had no convincing way to
explain the intrapsychic, structural, or cultural forces that might, operating below
the surface, block amity and cooperation.6
This spirit of American meliorism has crept into bioethics by a reliance on
bureaucratic fixes that move decision-making authority from physician to
institutional ethics committee and a reliance on procedures that are "legitimized"
by the proper signatures on official documents. What we have failed to do is to
pay equal attention to the forces that may inhibit the new policies and procedures
from achieving the intended goals. For example, as production pressures on
physicians mount, as more tasks have to be accomplished and more information
fitted into the typical doctor-patient encounter, as supervisory authorities monitor
more closely the time physicians spend with patients-so that unproductive
physician outliers are more easily sanctioned-informed consent has become a
casualty to the pressure to control costs and to increase productivity. 7 Not only
"scientific" approach to society, pragmatic philosophy, and the political movement that we identify
as "progressivism." The sociologist/philosophers that I am drawing on most heavily for these
discussion are CHARLES HORTON COOLEY, HUMAN NATURE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER (1902) and
GEORGE H. MEAD, MIND, SELF AND SOCIETY: FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A SOCIAL BEHAVIORIST
(Charles W. Morris ed., 1934). For two interesting discussion of how Mead's philosophy "geared
into the world"-to borrow a term from the phenomologist Alfred Schutz-and guided his
involvement in urban reform politics in Chicago, see Dmitri N. Shalin, G.H. Mead, Socialism, and
the Progressive Agenda, 93 AMER. J. SoC. 913 (1988).
5. For an example of how much American Social Theory in the Progressive age rested on
communication as a solution to the social problems that trailed in the wake of mass immigration,
urbanization, and industrialization, see the "Society" section of Mead's Mind, Se/land Society, and
pay particular attention to how many times Mead invokes communication as necessary for human
progress. MEAD, supra note 4, at 227-336. For a good analysis of how fundamental the idea of
communication is to American civil religion, see ROBERT N. BELLAH, BEYOND BELIEF: ESSAYS ON
RELIGION IN A POST-TRADITIONAL WORLD 168-89 (1970).
6. The absence of a dynamic theory of the unconscious means that failures of memory,
various misspeakings and mis-hearings-that is, shared misunderstandings-and all the other
accidents and misfirings of social life not only lack meaning but, more importantly, cannot be
imbued with meaning at the level of in our individual or collective lives.
7. See David Mechanic et al., Are Patients' Ojjice Visits with Physicians Getting Shorter?,
344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 198 (2001) for an interesting discussion of how, although the actual amount
of time of an average encounter has marginally increased, both patients and physicians report
feeling more rushed during the typical visit. For a discussion of the impact of this sense of being
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are our policy solutions often unmindful of the structural and psychic barriers
that stand in the way of their implementation; our ways of talking about the
success and their failure of those solutions are often equally thin.
This thin conceptualization of the dilemmas of the human condition
embedded in medical care that leads to policies that are both simplistic and
unrealistically optimistic is not true of Jay Katz's work. However, the policy
solutions and value commitments found in his work are not markedly different
than those offered by mainstream American bioethicists. He too would like to see
patients exercise more decision-making authority. His value commitments are no
less egalitarian or democratic than the more optimistic cast of much of American
bioethics. What makes Jay's work both so inspiring to me, and such a model of
"the reality principle" is that Jay recognizes that there are some problems that can
be confronted but not definitively resolved, and that such recognition is the first
step towards developing honest ways of dealing with them.
As a graduate student I was taught that the notion that some problems
recurred in the human condition was the gloomy response of Weber, Durkheim,
and Freud to modernity.8 Tragic Europeans were compared to sunny Americans.
Though my teachers were careful to emphasize that sunny and tragic were merely
descriptive, not evaluative, terms, we all realized that these adjectives carried
career implications. Thus, many of us were confronted with a very difficult
choice as we went about our work. One alternative was to embrace a sunny but
impoverished understanding of human behavior that promised to improve some
perceived social problem. The rationale for such cheery self-delusion went no
deeper than the realization that those who fund social research prefer promises
that their investments will yield returns. The second alternative was to adopt a
more sober but also more powerful perspective that recognizes the irremediable
difficulties built into social life, acknowledges that defending against some
dangers in social life creates new vulnerabilities, and takes the law of unintended
consequences seriously. The second alternative required some courage. Sponsors
of funded research prefer results to a more profound understanding of problems
that will recur in one form or another no matter how social life is organized.
Journal editors prefer positive results to a demonstration that the more some
rushed on trust within the doctor-patient relationship, see David Mechanic, The Functions and
Limitations of Trust in the Provision of Medical Care, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 661 (1998);
and David Mechanic & Marsha Rosenthal, Responses of HMO Medical Directors to Trust Building
in Managed Care, 77 MILBANK Q. 283 (1999).
8. See generally EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE (Karen E.
Fields trans., The Free Press 1995) (1912); MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF
CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons trans., Routledge 1992) (1930); SIGMUND FREUD, Civilization and Its
Discontents (1930), reprinted in 21 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL
WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 59 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1964).
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things change the more they stay the same.
Jay Katz's work stands as a model of how we can be honest, realistic
advocates for positions at the same time that we acknowledge the inherent limits
not only of those positions but of our own inherent human limitations. Nothing is
to be gained from pretending the existential dilemmas involved in becoming ill,
trying to heal, or acting as a caregiver are anything other than difficult work that
require much more than we are able to give. Rather than simply mourn our
failures to achieve the rational utopias that our policies seem to promise, we need
to leam from the failures, and since our failures are multiple, there will always be
much to consider. Determining what constitutes sensible action in trying times
and under trying conditions is difficult. So long as we only blink, but do not shut
our eyes in the face of these difficulties, there is much that we can learn.
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